The paper explores the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the economies of the Western Balkan countries during their transition to a market system. The paper recalls the political and historical circumstances that have delayed transition in the Western Balkan countries and draws attention to the specific features of FDI there that have influenced their economic development. The main hypotheses are tested econometrically focusing on data from the manufacturing sector, at an aggregate and disaggregated level. We identify almost no significant horizontal spillover effects. In part, this can be explained by the low absorptive capacity of the Western Balkan economies in comparison to the Central East European countries. Important policy implications derive from our findings: in order to accelerate economic development, Western Balkan policy makers will need to implement different types of economic policies, applying a more pro-active industrial policy.
Foreign Direct Investment in the Western Balkans: What role has it played during transition?
Introduction
In this paper, we explore how foreign direct investment (FDI) has affected the development path of the economies of the Western Balkan countries -Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia), Montenegro and Serbia.
More specifically, we try to answer the question: to what extent has FDI contributed to economic development of the Western Balkan countries during their transition to market economy? Economic development is understood in its broadest sense, as a process that provides a country's citizens a general improvement of economic, political and social well-being. Our approach is necessarily long-term including the whole period from the early 1990s onwards, since transition-related economic and political reforms effectively started in all the Western Balkan states at that time. 3 In order to address the question, we consider the nature and form of inward FDI to the region, as well as test for horizontal spillovers in the manufacturing industry, at the aggregate and sectoral level (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcic, 2004; Haskell, Perreira, Slaughter, 2007) .
Our study therefore relates to the large literature focusing on the impact of FDI on recipient economies. The literature has stressed the distinction between direct effects of FDI on the growth and development process, via for example the provision of capital from abroad without adding to national debt, and the indirect effects which operate primarily through externalities such as the diffusion of technology, or management and labour skills. Clearly in welfare economics terms only the latter merit policy intervention because if there are positive spillover effects from FDI, the social benefits may exceed the private ones. However, the evidence about the impact of FDI is mixed (Navaretti and Venables, 2004) . The macro level analysis has explored the relationship between FDI and growth, investment and productivity where the central question has been to identify whether countries that get greater FDI grow faster. In general, economic growth is found to be positively associated with FDI but only under certain conditions: for example when countries are sufficiently rich (Blömstrom et al., 1994) ; have a minimum threshold stock of human capital (Borensztein et al., 1998) ; or are financially developed (Alfaro et al., 2004) . These positive findings are not however corroborated in Carkovic and Levine (2005) who take into account the problem of reverse causality and do not find evidence in support of a relationship between FDI and growth. The micro literature instead investigates the effects of FDI on firms and industries (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) . Research is focused on identifying productivity spillovers to domestic firms, both horizontal (Haskell, Perreira, Slaughter, 2007) and vertical (Javorcic, 2004) . Görg and Greenaway (2004) who survey some 40 studies conclude that the evidence for positive productivity spillovers is weak.
Meta-analyses indicate that the scale and direction of the FDI impact on the host economy are conditional on factors such as the level of development (Meyer and Sinani, 2009) or minimum levels of human capital, financial market development and market linkages (Bruno and Campos, 2014) .
The empirical evidence to date on spillovers from FDI into transition economies is also mixed. Meyer and Sinani (2009) identify five studies covering the transition region. In three (Liu, 2002 on China; Yudaeva, Kozlov, Melentieva, and Ponomareva, 2003 on Russia; and Sinani and Meyer, 2004 on Estonia), positive spillovers are identified but in two others the effects are found to be negative (Konings, 2001 on Bulgaria and Romania and Djankov and Hoekman, 2000 on Czech Republic). Even so, it is widely argued that FDI played an extremely important role throughout most of the transition region, as a supplement to domestic savings and frequently as a major driver of enterprise restructuring during privatizations (Estrin et al, 2009 ). However, little attention has been paid to the impact of FDI on the Western Balkans, an area in which the transition process has been slower and less successful than in other regions such as Central and Eastern Europe. In this region, the need for FDI to substitute for limited domestic savings is great, but the low levels of income suggest that the region may have limited absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) , and therefore find it hard to exploit potential spillovers from FDI.
These issues are highlighted by the unfortunate recent political history of the Balkan region, with conflicts, fragmentation and low growth, that has exercised a long lasting and independent effect on the prospects for receipt of FDI. Our earlier findings suggest that even when the size of their economies, distance from the source economies, institutional quality and prospects of EU membership are taken into account, the Western Balkan countries still received less FDI than other transition countries (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) . This implies that the Balkans may conjure troubled images of war and conflict, rather than investment opportunities and economic potential (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010) . Moreover, judging from the relatively unsatisfactory overall economic performance of the Balkan countries today, FDI does not seem to have substantially contributed to their economic development. The present paper uses empirical and econometric methods in attempting to verify whether this is so: has the impact of FDI on economic development of the Balkan countries been limited?
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls why transition to a market economy has been delayed in the Western Balkans and points to the main consequences that these specific features of transition have had for FDI. Section 3 gives an overview of the main conclusions of the literature on the spillover effects of FDI in the transition region and identifies the standard approach used in empirical studies measuring the impact of FDI. Section 4 tests the main hypotheses econometrically. Section 5 interprets the results by examining a number of indicators of absorptive capacity. The last section contains the conclusions and policy recommendations.
Western Balkans delayed transition: the consequences for FDI
The transition to a market economy in the Western Balkan countries was delayed by a series of unfortunate events which started with the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia in mid-1991. The break-up of the Yugoslav federation was followed by a decade of military conflicts -in Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-95) , Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95) , Kosovo (1998-99) and Macedonia (2001) . In addition to wars, several countries were under embargos: the newly created Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting at that time of Serbia (including Kosovo) and Montenegro, was under severe UN and EU sanctions during most of the 1990s, whereas Macedonia was under economic sanctions imposed by Greece. Political priorities and inward-oriented nationalistic policies rendered many transition-related economic reforms of secondary importance.
These political events that affected most Balkan countries for more than a decade have had very profound and long-lasting economic consequences (Uvalic, 2010) . Political objectives frequently led to inappropriate economic policies, which in turn greatly contributed to unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance throughout most of the 1990s: hyperinflation, reversals in growth recovery, high public deficits and rapidly depreciating exchange rates. Many economic reforms necessary for implementing the transition to a market economy were deliberately postponed. As a result of political instability, delayed democratization and slow economic transition, the Balkan countries have also been slower in integrating with the European Union (EU) than the Central East (Sanfey and Zeh, 2012; World Bank, 2014: 11-12) . Following the lack of interest of foreign investors in the Western Balkan economies during the 1990s, there was an upsurge in FDI in the 2000s, prompted by privatizations of enterprises and banks and improved economic prospects.
Despite many positive developments, the Western Balkan countries have also had persistent structural problems that became evident particularly after the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis in late 2008 (see Bartlett and Prica, 2012) . Over the years many problems have been accumulating that became unsustainable -consumption higher than production financed by foreign savings and investment, increasing current account deficits, huge unemployment, insufficient enterprise restructuring and inadequate structural changes that have favoured primarily the fast expansion of services. The policy model based on fast trade and financial opening, rapid credit expansion and increasing dependence on foreign capital has been far less successful in the Western Balkans in the 2000s than in Central Eastern Europe a decade earlier (Uvalic, 2013; Sanfey and Zeh, 2012) . Despite the gradual integration of the Balkan economies into the EU and global economy thanks to an unprecedented increase in foreign trade, these countries have had rising trade deficits essentially due to insufficient competitiveness on global markets, a conclusion that emerges from various indicators (Sanfey and Zeh, 2012 destroyed by military conflicts. Moreover, both the initial legislation and subsequent privatization laws adopted by Yugoslavia's successor states relied quite substantially on sales at privileged terms to insiders, because this was considered necessary in order to get popular support after decades of workers self-management (Estrin and Uvalic, 2008) . The deliberate preference given to employee ownership as a privatization method is likely to have restricted the amount of inward FDI, at least initially.
Second, the Balkan countries have gone through a significant process of deindustrialization. (Bartlett, 2008) . All the socialist economies had an over-represented industrial sector and a low share of services, which were viewed as a serious structural distortion reflecting overindustrialization (Turley, 2013, p. 21 telecommunications, real estate and wholesale and retail trade (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) . The share of sectors exposed to the current crisis such as finance is relatively high, and so is trade which has only a relatively moderate technological impact (Kalotay, 2013) . In contrast to these services, by 2010 only two countries had attracted a considerable amount of FDI in manufacturing -Bosnia and
Herzegovina ( Thus, the divergence between the Western Balkans and the more successful countries in Central Eastern Europe is in most cases substantial in this respect also. Compared to the new EU member states, the Balkan countries have a long way to go in the competition for FDI not only in volumes but also in terms of composition of inflows (Kalotay, 2013, p. 254 ).
These features suggest that FDI may have been less an agent of structural change in the Western Balkan countries than in Central Eastern Europe, indicating why the former have not been more successful in developing export potential and integrating into global supply chains (Handjiski et al. 2010, p. 16; Becker at al., 2010; Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) . Having gone through a deeper economic downturn and a stronger process of deindustrialization than the new EU member states , the Western Balkans actually needed more FDI for the purposes of industrial restructuring and consequently, a larger proportion of investment into manufacturing, yet they have received comparatively less. Since the bulk of FDI has been in non-tradable services, FDI could not have contributed in a major way to promoting exports or to industrial diversification and upgrading. One of the consequences is that the Western Balkans are today less integrated into the global economy than the more successful Central East European countries, as measured by their exports of goods and services/GDP ratio (see Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) . FDI also does not seem to have generated much new employment in the Western Balkan countries, judging from the highly unsatisfactory situation on their labour markets.
It could be argued that the sectoral composition of FDI in the Western Balkans, prevalently directed towards services and much less towards manufacturing, should not be an obstacle to economic development, since services are as important as other sectors for facilitating a country's economic progress. Moreover, in the context of global supply chains, the distinction between 'tradables' and 'non-tradables' is less important, since many services add value to manufactured goods exported abroad. The dominance of services in the structure of the Western Balkan economies is therefore not a problem per se, and it indicates that the region is following similar trends of structural change as other European countries where services also contribute well over 60 percent of GDP. The problem lies in the fact that the Western Balkan countries have become predominantly service economies at a relatively low level of economic development -as already mentioned there is a huge development gap between the Western Balkan countries and the EU. Services have increased their share in GDP without the Western Balkans previously having built a strong industrial base that would allow them to substantially increase exports, achieve a higher degree of trade openness and integrate through business networks and global value chains into the world economy. Given the structure of FDI so far, we can assume that foreign investors have contributed only marginally to speed up these processes of integration. Since foreign companies and banks have invested prevalently into non-tradable services, such investments can contribute only indirectly to developing these countries export potential. The structure of services exported by the Western Balkans in 2012 reveals that 50-80 per cent is travel and transport which are sectors mainly related to tourism (World Bank, 2015) . Tourism is clearly important for Croatia and Montenegro, but even in this case being a highly season-sensitive sector it contributes to exports only some months a year.
In the other Western Balkan countries tourism is of marginal importance given that they are landlocked countries, despite their efforts to develop inland tourism. The most sophisticated part of service exports -insurance and finance -still represent a negligible part of overall exports of services of the Western Balkan countries (see World Bank, 2015) . Despite the rapid privatisation of most banks and insurance companies in the Western Balkans, primarily through foreign acquisition, the operations of banks and insurance companies are mainly oriented towards the domestic market.
It is worth recalling that in the European Union manufactures today account for a very large proportion of tradables (75 per cent of EU exports), and their higher tradability combined with the increasing services intensity imply that they have assumed an important carrier function for services (European Commission, 2013) . Despite the declining share of manufacturing in EU's GDP and employment, manufacturing is widely acknowledged as the engine of the modern economy (Berger, 2013) . Firms in manufacturing are more inclined to undertake innovation and research, and productivity growth is higher in manufacturing than in the rest of the economy (see European Commission, 2013). Moreover, the economic crisis has underlined the importance of the real economy, particularly manufacturing, for economic growth, since it is precisely countries that have The described features of the Western Balkan economies have guided our initial hypotheses that FDI may have had a minor development impact. With these premises in mind, we have decided to concentrate our empirical analysis on the spillover effects of FDI in the most important tradable goods sector -manufacturing -since this is the sector that is responsible for the prevalent part of Western Balkan countries exports.
Impact of FDI on economic development
The "Washington Consensus" held that the flow of capital, technology, knowledge and skills across national boundaries via FDI opens opportunities for all host economies, and that these might be greater for economies where the technology gap was larger so the gains from technological diffusion were greater (Caves, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1999; Moran, Graham and Blomstrom, 2005) . The literature identifies two types of effect: macro-economic and at the disaggregated level (Bruno and Campos, 2014) . The former relates to the impact on investment and economic growth from the enhanced levels of savings being financed from non-domestic sources.
The macro-economic impacts of FDI can be direct, through the enhancement of investment leading to the creation of jobs and growth in the economy. The macro-economy can also be stimulated indirectly via the provision to the host economy of access to advanced technology which will raise total factor productivity and factor incomes. Moreover, international competitiveness may be improved with rising productivity levels, allowing the host economy to increase exports and strengthen the balance of payments, perhaps alleviating international finance constraints to economic growth (Borenzstein et al, 1998) . Finally Caves (1996) emphasizes the potential advantages to the recipient economy through contributions to the restructuring of the economy.
However, even at the aggregate level, there are possible negative effects from FDI, which may reduce or even outweigh the potential benefits. Most importantly, foreign investment intensifies competition in the host economy. In many ways, this might be seen as an unambiguously positive effect, putting pressure on local firms to improve the performance or be driven out of business.
However, this assumes that the foreign firms do not resort to non-competitive practices, for example predatory pricing, exploiting their greater financial muscle to drive domestic firms out of the host market. Furthermore key national institutions, such as Anti-Trust authorities, are often weak in developing economies (Meyer and Surani, 2009) , which makes the likelihood of anti-competitive behavior post-investment more likely. In addition, domestic firms may not have the absorptive capacity to raise their productivity to the levels attained by their new foreign competitors; the technological gaps may be too large and the availability of human capital too limited for competitive processes to raise performance across the economy (Zahra and George, 2002) . Such problems may be exacerbated if there are shortages of key skills in the host economy, including managerial ones, and foreign firms are in a position to offer more attractive employment contracts, thereby attracting many of the most skilled workers from domestic firms. As a result, despite the additional investment from abroad, domestic investment may decline and expected employment gains from the foreign investment may be more than matched by employment falls from former domestic suppliers.
However, the literature on the host country effects of FDI mostly addresses the possibility of productivity spillovers. As noted by Haskell et al. (2007) , spillovers from FDI are of particular significance for policy makers because in their absence there is no case for policy intervention in support of FDI. Foreign firms generally possess more advanced technology and have more advanced management practices compared to domestic competitors (Caves, 1996) . Once foreign firms have entered a domestic market, the diffusion of ideas and transfer of technology resulting from interaction with the local economy are likely to occur via a variety of formal and informal contacts and exchanges (Haskel et al., 2007; Javorcik, 2004) . These are the source of spillovers to domestic firms, and are typically considered to operate either within an industry (horizontal) or up and down a value chain of industries (vertical).
Examples of mechanisms for positive spillovers in the literature include those through the dissemination of new higher levels of technological productivity on locally-owned firms (Ayyagari and Kosova, 2010; Barrios et al., 2005) via demonstration effects or reverse engineering (Barry et al., 2003) . This can occur when foreign firms augment the knowledge base in the local market by introducing new products, processes, management techniques and workforce skills. Interaction with foreign firms increases awareness of the availability of new knowledge, and enables domestic firms to learn about these technologies and market opportunities so as to raise their productivity by imitating the superior manufacturing techniques of foreign firms in their industry (Kokko, 1992) .
Local firms may also be able to exploit the knowledge of workers poached from foreign owned firms and trained in new technological or managerial methods, either vertically or horizontally (Fosfuri et al., 2001) . Vertical spillovers may occur because foreign owned firms seek to raise the productivity of their local suppliers so as to reduce wastage rates and raise product quality.
However, as for the macro-economic impact, some authors also highlight that there could be negative spillover effects for domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Barrios et al., 2005) . We have already noted the possibility of the crowding out of domestic firms in an industry through the use of uncompetitive practices such as predatory pricing or entry-deterrence (Caves, 1996) .
In this paper, we will explore the impact of FDI on various measures of performance at the level of the manufacturing sector as a whole and at the more disaggregated industrial level for the Western Balkan economies. We will therefore test for macro-economic effects and for horizontal spillovers.
We do not have data that allows us to test for vertical spillovers. This is the first time that the impact of FDI has been investigated for the countries in this region as a whole. Before proceeding to the empirical work, it is worth noting that foreign capital has been an important supplement to domestic savings in the Western Balkans, greatly contributing to financial accumulation during the past twenty years (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) . In the transition region, the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation has tended to be higher than the world average and has increased over time (Kalotay, 2010, pp. 61-2) . FDI has also played an important role in enterprise restructuring in most countries in the Balkans and Central Eastern Europe during privatizations, in this way strengthening the private sector and contributing to structural changes. Industrial restructuring usually tended to accelerate when privatization involving FDI was implemented (Estrin et al, 2009 ), frequently creating a dichotomy between the modern, foreign-owned enterprises and the traditional industries.
The dominant view has been that FDI has had positive spillover effects for the whole economy, though there have also been findings that run counter to such optimistic conclusions, such as those by Mencinger (2003) . Due to the concentration of FDI in trade and finance, multinational companies investing in the Balkans may have contributed more to imports than to exports, as has often been the case in the Central East European countries (Mencinger, 2003) . It has also been argued that the contribution of FDI to structural change in various groups of transition economies has been very uneven, having been stronger in the new EU member states than in the Balkan countries (Kalotay, 2010, p. 73) .
FDI spillovers in the Western Balkans

Model Specification
The standard test for the impact of FDI on the domestic economy comes by estimating equations of the form:
where i denotes the level of aggregation (national, industry, supply chain), t denotes time and Y is a measure of performance, for example industry productivity (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Haskell et al, 2007) . FDI represents the foreign presence in the country, sector or supply chain depending on the level of aggregation i. Z is a vector of control variables, such as factor inputs if Y is sectoral productivity (Haskell et al, 2007) , and e is the error term.
Our estimates are done at two levels of aggregation. First, at the aggregate level (manufacturing sector), where we consider three performance variables (Y); output (manufacturing value added), employment in manufacturing and manufacturing exports. The equation is estimated in levels and in first difference form, with the latter therefore considering output, employment and export growth in manufacturing. The FDI variable measures FDI inflows into the manufacturing sector as a whole (or its rate of change).The control variables are country and time specific fixed effects. Second, we consider horizontal spillovers by focusing on performance at the level of manufacturing sectors.
Once again we use three performance variables (Y); sectoral output (value added), sectoral employment and sectoral exports. The equation is estimated in levels and in first difference form, with the latter therefore considering output, employment and export growth in each manufacturing sector. The FDI variable is FDI flow (lagged) into the relevant sector (or its rate of change) and the controls are time and sector dummies.
Data
We have three measures of performance. The first is manufacturing value added, the second is employment in manufacturing and the third is manufacturing exports. 
Results
The results of our regression analysis are reported in Tables 1-4 . In Table 1 we show estimates of equation (1) at the level of the manufacturing sector as a whole. The performance variable, Y, in equation 1 takes the form of manufacturing value added, employment and exports in columns 1-3
respectively. In Table 1 we show the results for the static version of the equation and in Table 2 we report the dynamic version. It can be seen that there is no evidence of spillover effects on any of the measures of performance either with respect to the level of FDI or its change. The pattern of performance is almost entirely determined by country and time specific factors.
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In more aggregated level, with almost no evidence of horizontal spillovers. However there is a positive significant effect of FDI inflows in the other manufacturing sectors (on value added) and in the chemical sector (on exports). There is a negative significant impact on employment in the textile sector, probably due to workers layoffs following enterprise privatization and restructuring.
Finally in Table 4 we show results for the same regression as in Table 3 , but estimated in rate of change form. There are even fewer significant results in this more demanding specification; there is only one weakly significant effect identified. Thus the lagged change of FDI inflows reduces manufacturing value added in the machinery and transport sector.
Explaining the results
Our empirical findings suggest that FDI inflows have had no impact on manufacturing value-added, We illustrate these issues on the basis of 13 indicators that evaluate institutional, political and economic characteristics that might influence FDI spillovers (see Table 5 ). The list is a selection of indicators which seem amongst the most relevant for FDI spillovers. and Estrin, 2004) . The Western Balkans have received similar support from the European Union but only a decade later, and the general political climate has been much less enthusiastic because of the residual political problems in the region. Moreover EU conditionality has been much more stringent and demanding than towards the CEEB countries.
11 These indicators must be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, because most of them are based on perceptions of progress in a given area that often diverges from reality. Moreover, these indicators have a specific purpose, not related to this use, namely to shape the Western governments policies of aid and intervention (Woodward, 2009, pp. 152-157) . Third, a country's annual change in position is not necessarily determined by its own progress, but by the deterioration of performance of other countries. Finally, if we shift to global comparisons, the Western Balkan countries are not doing as badly as when compared with the ten CEEB countries; thus on a global scale, none of the Balkan countries are on the UNDP list of 64 worst performing countries or in DFID's proxy list of fragile states (Woodward, 2009 ).
Conclusions and policy implications
Our main finding is that virtually no FDI spillovers occurred in the manufacturing sector in the Western Balkan countries during 2002-12. This is consistent with the literature which suggests that spillovers will be conditional on the host economy institutions and absorptive capacity. According to most indicators, absorptive capacity is limited in the Western Balkans countries. Our analysis raises important policy issues both for the Western Balkans and for the ongoing wider debate on the "new growth model" in transition economies (Becker et al, 2010) .
The first question regards policy-makers perceptions about inward FDI into the Western Balkan region and in particular what governments can or cannot do to attract more FDI (Demekas et al., 2005) . Our earlier work has shown that FDI in the Balkans is influenced not only by government policies such as institutional reforms and tax incentives, but also by exogenous factors such as size, level of development and geographical position (Estrin and Uvalic, 2014) . Fragmentation leading to a lack of scale economies is a serious handicap of the Western Balkan countries (Kalotay, 2013) that cannot be easily overcome, except through more intensive regional cooperation and An even more important question concerns the type of policies that governments might implement to influence the quality of FDI, particularly its sectoral distribution. The relationship between the quantity and the quality of FDI is not well understood (Kalotay and Filippov, 2009, p. 32 industries, it will be difficult for the service sector alone to ensure increasing exports and a faster integration into the global economy. FDI promotion therefore needs to be linked to these important objectives of national economic development.
After more than six years of economic crisis and bleak prospects of a more sustained economic recovery, it seems risky for the Western Balkan governments to wait for the return of inward FDI and to continue relying on investors capabilities to restructure their economies. Legal harmonization with the EU acquis presently in course is positive, but it is not enough. In the short term, one of the main challenges of policy makers is to counterbalance the negative overhang of the crisis on FDI which is coming partly from source countries that are deeply affected by the crisis (Greece, Italy) and in industries that are also negatively impacted, such as banking (Kalotay, 2013) . However, the key challenge is the current lack of an industrial policy that would lay the basis for the investment promotion strategy attracting better quality FDI. 
